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regime to the restricted migration regime. We find strong support
for the "magnet hypothesis" under the free-migration regime, and the
"fiscal burden hypothesis" under the restricted-migration regime even
after controlling for diﬀerences in educational quality and returns to
skills in source and host countries.
1 Introduction
This paper aims at revisiting the social magnet hypothesis in international
migration. It investigates the impact of the generosity of the welfare state
in attracting migrants from abroad. The paper looks specifically at the skill
composition of migration patterns, highlighting the diﬀerence between skilled
and unskilled migration rates. The novelty of the paper is in looking at
the role of mobility restrictions in shaping the eﬀect of the welfare state on
migration. In a free migration regime, the impact on the skill composition
is expected to be negative while in a restricted regime, the impact might be
the opposite one, as voters will prefer selective migration policies favoring
skilled migrants who tend to be net contributors to the fiscal system.
Public debate on immigration has increasingly focused on its eﬀects on
the welfare state, amid concerns that immigrants are a fiscal burden. For ex-
ample, the average aggregate social spending as a percent of GDP for EU14,
Norway and Switzerland, between 1980 and 1995, was around 21 percent,
compared to around 18 percent in the US, 17 percent in Canada, and 13 per-
cent in Australia. An interesting diﬀerential characteristic of immigration be-
tween the EU14/Norway/Switzerland (EUR) and the US/Canada/Australia
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is the higher relative skill composition of immigrants in the latter countries
(see Table 1).1 On first glance, this suggests that countries that have gen-
erous welfare systems also have relatively more unskilled immigrants, i.e.
welfare state generosity acts as a magnet for unskilled migrants. However,
the skill composition of immigrants depends on many factors, and in partic-
ular on the policy regime; namely whether migration is free or restricted. In
other words, the generosity of the welfare state may aﬀect the skill compo-
sition of immigrants diﬀerently, depending on which immigration policy is
adopted. The generosity of the welfare state determines the self-selection of
potential migrants (supply-side mechanism) and the immigration policy in
the destination country (demand-side mechanism). This paper takes advan-
tage of heterogeneous bilateral immigration policies to identify and quantify
these two mechanisms. The paper investigates how the skill composition of
migration patterns diﬀer between free and restricted migration regimes. It
tests how the generosity of the welfare state aﬀects the skill composition of
the immigrants across these policy regimes.
There has been large body of research on welfare migration, though with
mixed results.2 For example, Borjas (1999), Enchautegui (1997) and McKin-
nish (2007) for the US and De Giorgi and Pellizzari (2006) for Europe3 show
1Docquier, Rapoport and Salomone (2011) classify host countries into five main groups
based on their immigration policies. They argue that Europe has low restrictiveness in
their immigration policies, while Western oﬀshoots (USA, Canada, Austraila) are more
skill-selective.
2See Brueckner (2000) for a review of this literature.
3See also Khoudour-Castéras (2008) who studies emigration from 19th century Europe.
He finds that the social insurance legislation, adopted by Bismarck in the 1880s, reduced
the incentives of risk averse Germans to emigrate. He estimates that in the absence of
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how the welfare-state generosity works eﬀectively as a magnet to migrants.
On the other hand, Levine and Zimmerman (1999), show that welfare benefits
have little eﬀect on the probability of female-headed households (the recip-
ients of the benefits) to relocate in the US and Gelbach (2004) finds strong
evidence of welfare migration in 1980, but less in 1990 for the US. However,
none of those studies control for the migration regime. 4 Studies of migration
between states within the US can help only in providing evidence of a free-
migration regime. On the other hand, studies that employ samples confined
to the policy-controlled migration regime, but at the same time employ a
model of the migrants’ choice whether to migrate and to which country, are
evidently problematic. In this case, the estimates convey little information
about the migrants’ choices (and hence on the welfare state as a magnet to
unskilled migrants), but rather on the migration policy choices of the host
country. Finally, studies that refer to both migration regimes without con-
trolling for them are problematic because they do not disentangle migration
policies in the host countries, and the individual migrant’s migration choices
in the source countries.
We use 14 core EU countries (old member states) plus Norway and
Switzerland (EUR thereafter) to study empirically the policy-regime diﬀer-
ential eﬀect of the generosity of the welfare state on the skill composition of
migration rates. Freedom of movement and the ability to reside and work
anywhere within the EU are two of the fundamental rights which EUmember
social insurance, the German emigration rate from 1886 to 1913 would have been more
than double its actual level.
4An exception is the unpublished paper by Cohen and Razin (2009) which we follow
and extend.
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states must recognize and this extends through bilateral treaties also to Nor-
way and Switzerland. In contrast, labor mobility into EUR member states
from non-EUR states is still restricted. The paper utilizes this diﬀerence in
policy regimes between EUR and non-EUR states, to test the key diﬀerences
between free- and policy-restricted migration.
The paper has four main features. First, since welfare benefits might be
one factor aﬀecting the skill composition of migration rates, we control for
other potential factors that are likely to aﬀect the selectivity of migration. As
Roy (1951) and Borjas (1987) argue the characteristics of those who emigrate
from a particular country will depend on that country’s wage distribution.
In poor countries, where the returns to skills are relatively high, there will be
a “negative selection” of immigrants; whilst in rich countries, where returns
to skills are relatively low, there will be “positive selection” of immigrants.
Thus we control for both returns to skills in the source country measured by
income inequality, as well as for the wage-premium skill diﬀerential in the
host country. Second, the paper considers, and distinguishes between, im-
migration from developing source countries as well as developed ones, since
the magnet eﬀect of the generosity of the welfare state on the immigrant
skill composition, and the fiscal burden eﬀect of these immigrants may be
diﬀerent for (poor) developing countries compared to those from richer devel-
oped ones. Third, because a proper measure of immigrant skill is key to our
analysis, we correct for educational quality an issue ignored in the empirical
migration literature. In this way we attempt to obtain a relatively homo-
geneous classification of skill levels using the Hanushek-Woesmann (2009)
measure of cognitive skills. Finally, we also control for the potential endo-
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geneity problem : the skill composition of migration itself may influence the
voters’ attitude towards the generosity of the welfare state.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section two provides the
theoretical framework underpinning our empirical analysis. Section three
presents the data sources and discusses the schooling quality measure. Sec-
tion four presents the econometric model and compares the findings for LDC
source countries relative to DC source countries. Section five concludes.
2 Theory
We present a minimalist model which features two migration regimes: free
migration and policy controlled migration regimes.5 In a nutshell, the policy-
controlled migration regime leads to a positive impact of the welfare benefits
on the skill composition of migration rates since voters will internalize the
fact that skilled migrants will be net contributors to the system- the fiscal
burden eﬀect-, whereas unskilled migrants will be net beneficiaries- the social
magnet eﬀect. Under the free migration regime the unskilled migrants will
gravitate to a generous welfare state, while skilled migrants will shy away.
2.1 Model
There is a continuum of workers, where the number of native born is nor-
malized to 1. Assume a Cobb-Douglas production function, with two labor
5See Razin, Sadka and Suwankiri (2011) for a more elaborate model.
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inputs, skilled and unskilled:
 = 1−  0    1 (1)
where,  is the GDP,  denotes a Hicks-neutral productivity parameter, and
 denotes the input of labor of skill level , where  =   for skilled and
unskilled, respectively.
The competitive wages of skilled and unskilled labor are equal to marginal
productivity, respectively
 =  (2)
 = (1− )
Aggregate labor supply, for skilled and unskilled workers, respectively, is
given by:
 = (+ )  (3)
 = (1− + (1− )) 
where  denotes the share of native born skilled in the total native born
labor supply;  denotes the share of skilled migrants in the total number of
migrants;  denotes the total number of migrants; and  is the labor supply
of an individual with skill level  ∈ { }
Total population (native born and migrants) is:
 = 1 +  (4)
We specify a simple welfare-state system which levies a proportional la-
bor income tax at the rate  , with the revenues redistributed equally to all
7
residents (native born and migrants alike) as social benefit per capita, .
The social benefit captures not only a cash transfer but also outlays on pub-
lic services, such as education, health, and other provisions, that benefit all
workers, regardless of their contribution to the tax revenues.
The government budget constraint is therefore
 =  (5)
Assume that the utility function for skill-type  ∈ { } is :
 =  − 
1 + 
1+
 (6)
where  denotes consumption of an individual with skill level ,  denotes
the individual labor supply and   0.
The budget constraint of an individual with skill level  is
 = + (1− )  (7)
Individual utility-maximization yields the following labor supply equation
 = ((1− ))  (8)
It is then straightforward to calculate the general equilibrium wages for
skilled and unskilled workers, which are given respectively by
 =  ¡1−¢ 11+
 =  ¡(1− ) −¢ 11+ (9)
where  ≡  (1− )1−
and  ≡ 1− + (1− )+  
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In order to ensure that the skilled wage always exceeds the unskilled wage,
  , we assume that
(1− + (1− ))
(1− )(+ )  1 (10)
2.2 Policy-controlled Migration
Assume that the host country faces abundant supply of migrants of each
one of the two skill types, so that host-country migration policy is the sole
determinant of migration flows. The policy is determined by the median voter
in the host country. Let us assume that the policy decisions on the tax rate,
  and the total volume of migration,  are exogenous. We do this in order
to focus the analysis on a single endogenous policy variable, which is the skill
composition of migrants,  Note that once    are determined, then the
social benefit per capita, , is given by the government budget constraint; we
thus denote the social benefit per capita  as (; ); where the exogenous
variable  is suppressed.
The indirect utility of an individual with skill level  is given by:
 (; ) =  (; ) + 1
1 +  [(1− ) (; )]
1+ (11)
Diﬀerentiating the equation with respect to , and employing the envelope
theorem, yields
 (; )
 =
(; )
 + (1− )  ( (; ))
 (; )
 (12)
Thus, a policy induced change in the share of skilled migrants in the total
number of migrants, , aﬀects the utility level through two channels. First,
an increase in  raises average labor productivity and thereby tax revenues.
9
This, in turn, raises the social benefit per capita, . Second, an increase in
, which raises the supply of skilled labor relative to the supply of unskilled
labor, depresses the skill-premium in the labor market. If the decisive voter
is unskilled, both of the above eﬀects increase her utility. Thus, an unskilled
voter would like to set the skill-composition of migrants at the maximal
limit,  = 1 This means that the share of skilled migrants preferred by the
decisive skilled voter is typically lower than that preferred by the decisive
unskilled voter. The decisive skilled voter would like to set  below 1 (which
is equivalent to assuming that the first-order condition is met before  reaches
1).
Defining  as the share of skilled immigrants most preferred by an indi-
vidual with skill level  =   in the host country, we get
   = 1
Recall that the purpose is to find the eﬀect of the change in the generosity
of the welfare state on the migration policy concerning . The generosity of
the welfare state, captured by the magnitude of the social benefit per capita,
, which depends positively on the tax rate,  (we assume that economy is
on the "correct side" of the Laﬀer curve). We thus look for the eﬀect of an
increase in  on the change in the skill composition of the migrants, . It
can be shown that:

 = 0;

  0 (13)
This means that, if the decisive voter is an unskilled worker, an increase
in the tax rate,  , would leave the skill migration policy unchanged, because
it is always set at the maximum possible limit. If, however, the decisive
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voter is a skilled worker, an increase in the tax rate,  , will change the policy
concerning the skill-composition of migrants in the direction towards a larger
share of skilled migrants. The reason is that when the tax rate is higher, the
redistribution burden upon a skilled decisive voter increases. Allowing an
additional skilled migrants can ease this rise in the fiscal burden. Note also
that the result applies to the skill mix of migration rates.
2.3 Free Migration
We now assume that no restrictions are placed on migration by the policy
makers in the host country. The level of migration depends entirely on the
choice made by would be potential migrants. In choosing whether to migrate
or not, a potential migrant of skill  compares his prospective utility, , in
the migration destination, to the reservation utility, denoted by  in the
source country. For each skill level , we assume that there is a continuum
of would-be migrants, diﬀerent with respect to the reservation utility level in
the source country. This heterogeneity of reservation utilities in the source
country could stem from diﬀerent traits of the potential migrants (e.g., family
size, age, moving costs, forms of portable pensions, housing, cultural ties,
etc.). Thus the host country faces an upward sloping supply curve, (), of
potential migrants from the source country, for each skill level .
Let  be the number of skilled migrants, and  is the number of
unskilled migrants. The proportion of skilled migrants,  , is defined then
by:
 =

1 + 
(14)
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The indirect utility function in the host country is given by:
 () = () + 1
1 +  ((1− ))
1+ (15)
The following equation determines, for each  , the cut-oﬀ levels of the
reservation utilities (() and (), for a would-be migrant of skill  =  
as follows:
 () =  ()  (16)
That is the marginal would be migrant is indiﬀerent between staying in the
source country or leaving to the destination country. We can use this equation
to find the number of migrants for each skill level. By definition, the number
of migrants of each skill level,  =  , is determined by the supply of migrants
for  =  , that is
() ≡ ( ()) (17)
We now attempt to find the eﬀect of an exogenous change in the gen-
erosity of the welfare state proxied by  on the skill mixture of the migrants.
It could be shown that:

  0 (18)
The rationale for this result is as follows. An increase in  raises the social
benefit per capita, , but lowers the net wage, (1− ) For skill migrants,
the fall in net wage outweighs the increase in the social benefit per capita.
Thus, an increase in  reduces the well-being of skilled workers. Conse-
quently, an increase in  reduces the cut-oﬀ reservation utility of skilled
migrants,  ()  As a result, those skilled migrants with reservation utilities
between the pre-increase level and the new cutoﬀ level will choose not to
migrate. The opposite holds true for unskilled migrants. Thus an increase
12
in the generosity of the welfare state under free migration deters skilled mi-
grants and attracts unskilled ones, thereby tilting the skill composition of
migration towards unskilled migrants. The result does not apply only to the
skill mix among migrants; note that the skill mix in migration rates is also
tilted towards unskilled migrants. This is the magnet eﬀect of the welfare
state.
3 Empirical Analysis
Our aim is to test how the generosity of the welfare state aﬀects the skill
diﬀerence in migration rates into EUR countries across policy regimes for
both developing and developed source countries after controlling for returns
to skills in source and host countries. It is common to focus on developed
countries (OECD countries) where skill levels (usually proxied by education
attainment) are comparable given the potential heterogeneity in education
quality across developed and developing countries.
3.1 Data
We decompose our sample into three groups as follows.6 Group A (EUR
to EUR) contains only the source-host pairs of countries which allow free
mobility of labor between them, according to the single-market treaty. Any
kind of discrimination between native-born and immigrants, regarding labor
market accessibility and welfare-state benefits eligibility is illegal. These are
6Our sample of source countries is dictated by data availability on educational quality.
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16 European countries (EUR): Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK,
Norway and Switzerland.
Group B (EUR and DC to EUR) includes only the developed source-
EUR host pairs of countries within which the source country residents cannot
freely move, work and receive social benefits in any of the host countries. The
source countries, however, are 10 developed countries: US, Canada, Japan,
Australia, New Zealand, Israel, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea and Singapore.
Group C (EUR and LDC to EUR) includes the developing source-EUR
host pairs of countries in which the source country residents cannot freely
move, work and receive social benefits in any of the host countries. Twenty
three developing countries are included: Argentina, Brazil, Chile China,
Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Jordan, India, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Mex-
ico, Morocco, Lebanon, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Tunisia, South Africa,
Thailand, Turkey and Venezuela.
We only consider immigration to EUR host countries. We distinguish
between LDC and DC source countries and run separate regressions in order
to compare the eﬀect of the welfare state in both cases. The determinants
of emigration and the eﬀects of the generosity of the welfare state are likely
to be diﬀerent for poor developing countries relative to richer, developed
ones:- e.g., the gap between the host and source countries in terms of wages,
amenities, social spending and welfare are larger for developing countries.
The analysis uses bilateral migration data from Docquier and Marfouk
(2006). The data contain bilateral immigrant stocks, based on census and
register data, for the years 1990 and 2000. Immigrants of a working age (25+)
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are defined as foreign-born. The immigrants are classified into three educa-
tion levels: low-skilled (0-8 schooling years), medium-skilled (9-12 schooling
years) and high-skilled (13+ schooling years). The data also contain the
stock of the domestic-origin labor force for all the countries.
Data for social spending is based on the OECD’s Analytical Database (av-
erage for 1974-1990). Social expenditure encompass all kinds of social public
expenditures, in cash or in kind, including, for instance, old-age transfers,
incapacity related benefits, health care, unemployment benefits and other
social expenditure. Social spending is in PPP 1990 US dollars and is divided
by the population of the host country to provide per capita benefits. Our use
of social spending per capita is motivated by the theory in section 2, where
social benefits per capita are the indicator of the generosity of the welfare
state. We also check the robustness of this measure using social spending as
a share in GDP, average for 1980-1990 based on OECD SOCX.
Examining the non-parametric evidence based on our sample, Table 2
shows, for example, that Sweden a highly generous welfare state attracts
higher rate of unskilled than skilled (about 30% higher) from other EUR
whereas Spain a less generous welfare state attracts higher rate of skilled than
unskilled migrants (48% higher) from other EUR. A the same time, in both
countries immigration rates from restricted regimes (both DC and LDC) are
more skilled than those from free migration regimes (EUR). It is also worth
noting that there is also high correlation between the two indicators of the
generosity of the welfare state, social expenditure as percent of GDP and
social expenditure per capita.
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3.2 Quality of Education and Enforcement of Immi-
gration Policies
Since our interest is in the eﬀect of the generosity of the welfare state on the
skill composition of migration rates, controlling for the heterogeneity in the
skill (education) measurement is essential. Indeed, Coulombe and Tremblay
(2007) show that measuring human capital using an output measure matters
considerably when assessing the contribution of immigrants in Canada, com-
ing from a wide range of countries. Ignoring diﬀerences in the educational
quality of source countries is likely to introduce a bias in estimates of the
generosity. On one hand, if immigration policies favor higher educational
attainment immigrants and one does not control for educational quality, this
would tend to produce an overestimate of the eﬀect of generosity on the skill
composition for LDC source countries. On the other hand, if high educated
immigrants are of poor quality, then their productivity would not be that
diﬀerent from their low-skilled counterparts: they would behave similar to
the low-skilled migrants, as being net beneficiaries, rather than net contrib-
utors to the welfare state. This results in an underestimate of the generosity
coeﬃcient. To address this potential problem, we adjust all the migration
stocks and rates for quality of education, using Hanushek and Woessmann
(2009) new measures of international diﬀerences of cognitive skills.
Hanushek and Woessmann (2009) use international assessments of stu-
dent achievement such as the First International Mathematics Study (FIMS),
the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) and
the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA). A total of 12
international student achievement tests (ISATs) were collected. Although
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varying across the individual assessments, to obtain a common measure of
cognitive skills, they rely upon information about the overall distribution of
scores on each ISAT to compare national responses. In order to compare
performance on the ISATs across tests and over time, they project the per-
formance of diﬀerent countries on diﬀerent tests onto a common metric. For
that, they develop a common metric both for the level and for the variation
of test performance. To make the level of ISATs comparable, they use the
only available information on educational performance that is consistently
available for comparisons over time: namely, in the form of the National
Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) from the United States, which
has tested the math, science and reading performance of nationally represen-
tative samples of 9-, 13-, and 17-year-old US students in an intertemporally
comparable way since 1969. The United States is also the only country that
has participated in every ISAT.
Their main measure of cognitive skills is a simple average of all standard-
ized math and science test scores of the ISATs in which a country partici-
pated. They use a group of countries to serve as a standardization bench-
mark for performance variation over time, and choose 13 OECD countries
that already had substantial enrollment in secondary education in 1964 and
have had relatively stable education systems, which they term the “OECD
Standardization Group” (OSG) of countries. Then for each assessment, they
calibrate the variance in country mean scores for the subset of the OSG par-
ticipating to the variance observed on the PISA tests in 2000 (when all OSG
countries participated). By combining the adjustments in levels (based on
the US NAEP scores) and the adjustment in variances (based on the OSG),
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they directly calculate standardized scores for all countries on all assess-
ments. Each age group and subject is normalized to the PISA standard of
mean 500 and individual standard deviation of 100 across OECD countries
(see Appendix B in Hanushek and Woessmann (2009) for full details).
Hanushek and Woessmann (2009) use their schooling quality measure
to provide evidence on the robust association between cognitive skills and
economic growth. They also find that home-country cognitive-skill levels
strongly aﬀect the earnings of immigrants in the US labor market in a
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences model that compares home-educated to US-educated
immigrants from the same country of origin. Thus suggesting that controlling
for the quality of schooling is important.
We use their imputed average test scores in math and science for primary
through end of secondary school, all years (scaled to PISA scale divided
by 100) for all source countries in our sample as our measure of Education
Quality (EQ).7 We adjust for varying quality of education across countries
by using relative quality of education in the source country relative to that
in the host country  =  and interact that with the migration
stocks. It is important to note two caveats due to the constraints of this
quality measure. First, this quality measure does not vary over time since it
is an average for various years thus we use the same measure for migration
stocks in the 1990s and 2000s. Second, we use the same quality measure for
the three educational levels. However, we check the robustness of our results
using diﬀerent methods to adjust for quality of education across countries.
7Coulombe and Tremblay (2007) provide an alternative way to correcting for diﬀerences
in education quality. They use skill-schooling gap.
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Table A1 shows the test scores for math and science scores based on
Hanushek and Woessmann (2009). One interesting issue is that education
quality varies not only between developed and developing countries but also
between developed countries and EUR: the average for EUR is 4.939, whilst
for DCs it is 5.132 and for LDCs it is only 3.99. This suggests that there
might be a need to control for quality of education not only when considering
developing countries but also developed ones. Table A2 provides a numerical
example of how we adjust for educational quality. For example, the unad-
justed Egypt-UK migration rate is 0.244, while the adjusted one using the
Relative Education Quality index is 0.198.
4 The Econometric Model
4.1 Regression Specifications
To estimate the diﬀerential impact of the welfare state generosity on the skill
diﬀerence in migration rates, one would ideally like to use flows rather than
stocks. However, our data is in stocks. We therefore specify the flows in
two ways: indirect way and direct one. The indirect way is to have the stock
variable as a dependent variable and a lagged stock variable as an explanatory
variable; eﬀectively measuring the eﬀect of all other explanatory variables on
the diﬀerence between the dependent variable and its lagged counterpart.
Alternatively, we use as the dependent variable the diﬀerence in the stock
variables in the two distinct time points.8
8Beine, Docquier and Ozden (2011) take the diﬀerence in stocks as a measure for flows.
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We specify migration selectivity, following Grogger and Hanson (2011),
by diﬀerences in migration rates.  denotes the stock of migrants of skill
level  (comprised of  skilled and  unskilled), who originated from source
country  and reside in host country , as a ratio of the stock of all native
workers   of skill level  in the source country  in  the year 2000. Since
our key hypothesis is that the eﬀect of welfare benefits on the skill selectivity
of immigrants vary according to the immigration regime, we use the skill
diﬀerence in the migration rates as follows:
  −  =  (19)
Thus, the skill diﬀerence selection equation is where the dependent vari-
able is  measuring the skill diﬀerence in selectivity of migrants, t=the
year 2000 and t-1= the year 1990:
 = 0+1−1+2+3()+4+5+6+
(20)
−1−1 = 0+2+3()+4+5+6+
(21)
The first specification 1a (eqn 20) with lagged dependent variable refers
to the indirect way of measuring the eﬀect of generosity on the flow variable;
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whereas the second specification 1b (eqn 21) refers to the direct way of doing
so where the dependent variable is the diﬀerence between 2000 () and 1990
(− 1).
 denotes the log average benefits per capita in host country  over the
period 1974-1990 and  is a policy regime dummy variable, which equals
0 if the source-host pair exercises free migration, and 1 otherwise. In our
sample, only migration between EUR countries is free (=0). Immigration
to EUR from non-EURDCs or LDCs is restricted (=1). We collect all the
other controls in (bilateral, host, or source) and discuss in details below. A
positive coeﬃcient indicates a positive eﬀect on the skill composition measure
of the migrants, and vice versa.
Note that the eﬀect of welfare state generosity on the skill diﬀerence
selectivity of the migrants under free migration is captured in the above
equation by the coeﬃcient 2. Therefore, the null hypothesis describing this
eﬀect is:
2  0 (22)
In addition, the eﬀect of welfare state generosity on the skill diﬀerence
selectivity of migration rates in the case of restricted migration is captured
by the coeﬃcient 2+3. Therefore the null hypothesis describing this eﬀect
is:
3  0 (23)
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4.2 Controls
We control for other factors that are likely to be skill dependent as follows.
First, we attempt to control for other immigration policy measures in the host
country that might have an eﬀect on the skill composition of immigrants. We
use refugees as a share in total immigrants in 1990 in the host country based
on the United Nations Population Division Statistics.9 To capture the eﬀect
of family re-unification schemes adopted in host countries we use the stock
of past migrants from the source country in the host country in 1990. Both
variables are expected to have a negative impact on the migrant skill mix,
since both policies attract low-skilled migrants.
One important determinant of migration is the wage diﬀerential or the
skill diﬀerential between source and host countries. We use real GDP per
capita (PPP) in 1990, constant US dollars, for both host and source coun-
tries in the absence of data on wages in the source countries. We also use
average unemployment rates (average for 1990-1995) in both source and host
countries.10
To capture better the Roy-Borjas selectivity factors which are likely to
aﬀect immigration selectivity, we use a battery of controls: (i) inequality
measure (the Gini coeﬃcient) in the source country in 1990;11 (ii) as a proxy
9Unfortunately, we were not able to obtain data on the number or share of refugees
for source-host pairs. We have also experimented with using the number of refugees and
asylum seekers in the host in 1997, and all our results were robust.
10Both GDP per capita and unemployment rates are from the World Bank World De-
velopment Indicators.
11Data on the Gini coeﬃcient are from the UNU-WIDER World Income Inequality
Database (WIID) 2008.
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for the returns to skill in the host country, the log value of the skilled-
unskilled native labor stock ratio in 199012 ; (iii) instead of (ii), for the host
country, the ratio of skilled-unskilled wage diﬀerential measured by the ratio
of labor compensation per employee in US dollars PPP in 199513; and (iv)
the diﬀerence in unemployment rates between the skilled and unskilled in
the host country in 1998.14
Additional bilateral controls, such as the distance between source-host
countries, which might deter unskilled immigrants more than skilled ones,
strong relation dummy based on past colonization, and same-language in
source-host countries, which might make immigration particularly attractive
for unskilled workers are included. We also control for quantity of education
using average years of schooling (+25 years ) in the source country, extracted
from theWorld BankWorld Development Indicators, in addition to adjusting
for educational quality as mentioned above. As a robustness check we also
use fixed eﬀects for source country in order to capture all potential push
factors. We also use clustering for each pair of source-host countries.
12The last two control variables do not add up to one because we omitted workers with
fewer than eight years of schooling.
13Skilled is financial and business services and unskilled is construction. Source OECD
Stat.
14Unemployment rates of the population aged 25-64 by level of education; skilled is
defined as upper secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education levels 3-4 (ISCED,
1997) and unskilled is defined as pre-primary, primary and lower-secondary education
levels 0-2 (ISCED, 1997). Source: Eurostat.
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4.3 Endogeneity of The Welfare State Generosity
A potential endogeneity problem may arise— in particular between the level
of benefits in the host country,  , and the skill diﬀerence in the migra-
tion rates, because skilled immigrants can influence the political economic
equilibrium level of benefits. For example, more immigration may lead to
lower level of social spending per capita if migrants are more likely to be-
come unemployed, or if migrants come with large dependent families. We use
the instrumented lagged level of benefits per capita in the host country, 
(the average for 1974-1990). To instrument  we use the legal origin in the
host country (English, Scandinavian, French or German) as an instrument.
We also instrument the interaction using the interaction between the
legal origin and The legal system indicates cultural and social features
of the host countries and reflect also basic constitutional notion regarding
the attitude towards property rights on the one hand, and social rights on
the other hand. Indeed we find a strong correlation between the legal origin
and the welfare benefits (cor = 60%). One concern might be that legal ori-
gin might be correlated with, for example, an omitted variable such as the
economic development which is known to aﬀect migration, and that could
potentially undermine the validity of the exclusion restriction. The empiri-
cal literature, however, is mixed with respect to whether legal origin has a
significant impact on economic development. For example, Acemoglu and
Johnson (2005) do not find evidence that the legal system significantly aﬀect
economic growth. However to ensure that this is not a possible channel for
us, we include GDP growth rate in the host country as a control variable. In
that way the only open channel for legal origin to aﬀect migration is through
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the instrumented . But in fact we don’t find GDP growth rate to be
significant.
5 Main Findings
5.1 Specification 1a
We first examine the estimates for Specification 1a. Table 3 presents the
OLS estimation results for both DCs and LDCs for our variables of interest.
Our first hypothesis relates to the eﬀect of welfare state benefits on the skill
diﬀerence in migration rates within free-migration regime. The social magnet
hypothesis is indeed confirmed (the first row) for Group A. The coeﬃcient is
negative and significant. That is, the generosity of the welfare state adversely
aﬀects the skill diﬀerence of migration in the free-migration regime, capturing
the market-based supply-side eﬀect.
The fiscal burden hypothesis, relates to the considerations of the host
country’s voters in policy-controlled migration regimes, is also confirmed.
As suggested in the Theory section, the diﬀerence between the diﬀerential
eﬀect of benefits across the controlled and free-migration regimes should be
positive. Indeed, the coeﬃcient is positive and significantly diﬀerent than the
corresponding coeﬃcient in the free migration regime (second row) for DCs
(Group B). That is, the eﬀect of the generosity of the welfare state on the
skill composition of migrants is positively aﬀected by the migration policy of
the host countries. However the coeﬃcient is not always significant for LDCs
(Group C) suggesting our a priori concern about the endogeneity of welfare
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benefits. The inclusion of the returns to skill proxy measured by the skilled-
unskilled native labor stocks ratio in the host country in 1990 (column 2), or
(column 3) the skilled-unskilled wage diﬀerential does not have much of an
eﬀect on the magnitude or significance of the coeﬃcients of the welfare-state
benefits. Similar results are obtained when using migration rates that are
adjusted for quality of education, i.e.  (see Table 4).
Turing to Table 5 which presents the IV estimates, it is important to note
that the first stage Cragg-Donald F-statistics show that our instruments are
not subject to weak instrument concerns. Indeed, we find evidence in favor
of the magnet hypothesis, i.e. a negative and significant eﬀect of welfare-
state benefits on the skill composition of immigrants within a free-migration
regime. The generosity of the welfare-state adversely aﬀects the skill compo-
sition of migrants in the free-migration regime. As predicted, using the IV,
we find the eﬀect of the generosity of the welfare-state on the skill composi-
tion of migrants under the policy-controlled migration regime is positive, for
both developed (Group B, Column 1) and developing countries (Group C,
Column 4). This result also holds after controlling for all the other push-pull
factors (Columns 2 and 3 for DCs and Columns 5 and 6 for LDCs). Recall
that in the case of the OLS estimates LDC coeﬃcients were not significant.
Turning to the restricted - migration regime we confirm the fiscal burden
hypothesis for both developed and developing source countries. That is 3
is positive and significant. In this regression, unadjusted for educational
quality, the eﬀect of the generosity tends to be larger for DCs compared to
LDCs. In terms of magnitude, our results suggest that 1% increase in welfare-
state benefit per capita spending changes the skill diﬀerence in migration
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rates in favour of skilled migrants for LDCs by about 2.0% and for DCs
migrants by about 3.5%.
Table 6 presents IV estimates using migration rates that are adjusted for
quality of education. It is clear that our previous results pertaining to the
negative eﬀect of the welfare-state benefits on the skill diﬀerence in migration
rates of immigrants within the free-migration regime hold. A positive eﬀect
within the restricted-migration regime for both DCs and LDCs hold after
adjusting for the quality of education also confirm the fiscal burden eﬀect.
Furthermore controlling for quality of education strengthens the positive ef-
fects of the skill composition of LDCs, and hardly changes the estimate for
DCs. We find that a 1% increase in welfare-state benefit spending would
improve the skill composition of LDCs migrants by around 2.5% and of DCs
migrants by around 3.4%.
There are potentially several reasons for the diﬀerence in eﬀect of the wel-
fare spending on migrant skill composition between LDCs and DCs. First, it
could be because policies controlling for immigration typically ignore diﬀer-
ences in educational quality even though they generate diﬀerent fiscal bur-
dens. Second, it could also be due to family re-unification and refugee immi-
gration policies adopted by EU countries— which are imperfectly measured
in our analysis.
Turning to the other control variables, the variables capturing immigra-
tion policies adopted in the EU have negative eﬀects, as expected: the share
of refugees in total migrants in the host country in 1990 and the total migrant
stock from the source country in the host country in 1990, have negative but
insignificant eﬀects. However, for LDCs, the total stock of migrants in 1990
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has a negative and significant eﬀect which can be interpreted as a diaspora
eﬀect as in Beine et al (2011).
Finally, examining the diﬀerential eﬀect of returns to skills under the two
policy regimes, we find, interestingly, that inequality in the source country
has a negative significant eﬀect on the skill mix of migrants from both LDCs
and DCs under restrictive migration and a positive eﬀect under free migra-
tion. Both are consistent with the Roy-Borjas hypothesis. As for the relative
returns to skill in the host, the higher the high-low labor ratio, the lower are
the returns to skill and the lower are the skill diﬀerence in migration rates.
However, this eﬀect seems to be significant only for DCs. Indeed, using the
wage diﬀerential between high- and low- skilled in the host country, which is
a better measure of returns to skills, shows that there is a positive relation-
ship between the returns to skill and the skill composition of migrants for
both DCs and LDCs under controlled migration, and no diﬀerential eﬀect for
free migration. Thus overall, the results indicate that even after controlling
for returns to skills, the generosity of the welfare state matters for the skill
composition of immigrants.
5.2 Specification 1b
Examining the estimates from the second specification 1b associated with
the flow dependent variable, Table 7 shows that for both DCs and LDCs,
the social magnet hypothesis holds, and that the findings support the fiscal
burden hypothesis. When adjusting for the flows by Relative Education
Quality, again the estimates for LDCs are aﬀected more than those for DCs,
and our previous results are all upheld.
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5.3 Robustness Checks
Returning to specification 1a, we provide in this sub-section a few robustness
checks by using diﬀerent methods to adjust for education quality and using
diﬀerent measure for benefits as follow.
5.3.1 Alternative Educational Quality Adjustments
Using Hanushek and Wossemann (2009) educational quality index, we adjust
the migration rates by interacting them with  as shown in panel 1 of
Table 8. Similarly using the Hanushek and Wossemann (2009) educational
quality index, we weight migration rates with  in panel 2 of Table 8. In
both cases our previous results are robust.
5.3.2 An Alternative Measure for the Generosity of the Welfare
State
Finally, we check whether our measure of the welfare generosity is robust.
In Table 8, panel 3, we replace the level of benefits per capita measure by
social spending as percent of GDP. Again, we find the generosity of the
welfare state adversely aﬀects the skill diﬀerence of migration in the free-
migration regime, capturing the market-based supply-side eﬀect, whilst the
fiscal burden hypothesis, capturing the considerations of the host country’s
voters in policy-controlled migration regimes, is also confirmed.
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6 Conclusion
In a free-migration regime, a typical welfare state with relatively abundant
capital and high total factor productivity (implying relatively high wages for
all skill levels) attracts both unskilled and skilled migrants. On the other
hand, the generosity of the welfare state attracts unskilled (poor) migrants,
as they are net beneficiaries of the generous welfare state. In contrast, poten-
tial skilled (rich) migrants are deterred by the generosity of the welfare state.
Thus the generosity of the welfare state shifts the migrant skill composition
towards the unskilled. In the restricted-migration regime, these same consid-
erations lead voters to favor skilled migration. Voters are motivated by : how
migration aﬀects their wages, and how it bears on the finances of the welfare
state. Typically, unskilled migration depresses the unskilled wage and boosts
the skilled wage. The opposite occurs with skilled migration. From a public
finance point of view, native-born voters of all skills would therefore opt for
the skilled to come and for the unskilled to stay away to mitigate the fiscal
burden.
We utilize the free labor movement within EUR (the EU, Norway and
Switzerland) and the restricted movement from outside of the EUR to com-
pare the free migration regime to the restricted migration regime. We find
strong support for the "magnet hypothesis" under the free-migration regime,
and the "fiscal burden hypothesis" under the restricted-migration regime
even after controlling for diﬀerences in returns to skills in source and host
countries.
Our findings highlight the importance of controlling for educational qual-
ity when studying high skilled migration from LDCs. In addition, it is clear
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from our analysis that immigration policies favoring high-skilled migrants
do need to take into account educational quality. Hence, a selective immi-
gration scheme based on years of education solely will not be as eﬀective in
identifying the high skilled as a point-based system where ability (for exam-
ple, language ability and labour market experience) are considered. Another
important implication of our findings is that under free-migration, the gen-
erosity of the welfare state acts as a magnet for the unskilled. This suggests
that harmonizing the minimum welfare provision within the EU may be an
attractive option to reduce the negative eﬀect of the welfare state on the skill
composition of EU immigrants under free-migration.
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Table 1: Immigration and Aggregate Social Spending 
Country of Immigration Low Education as % 
of total Immigration 
in 20001 
High Education as % 
of total Immigration 
in 20001 
Social expenditure 
as % GDP: 
average 1980-19952 
Austria 47.5 12.7 24.10 
Belgium 65.7 18.3 25.18 
Denmark 44.8 17.3 25.51 
Finland 48.7 23.8 23.96 
France 74.6 16.4 25.03 
Germany 65.9 21.8 23.28 
Greece 44.5 15 15.01 
Ireland 13.6 41.1 17.14 
Italy 52.9 15.4 19.66 
Netherlands 50.2 22 24.88 
Norway 22 28.7 20.05 
Portugal 59.7 18.6 12.25 
Spain 28.7 18.5 18.67 
Sweden 34.1 25.7 29.73 
Switzerland 54.9 18.6 14.85 
UK 34.1 34.9 18.16 
Average EUR  46.37 21.8 21.09 
    
Australia 35.3 40.3 12.93 
Canada 29.6 58.8 16.91 
USA 37.9 42.7 17.50 
Average AUS, CAN& US    34.27    47.27                15.78 
Sources: 1Docquier and Marfouk (2006). 2OECD, Social Expenditure Database (SOCX). 
Table 2: Skill-Difference in Migration Rates and Welfare State Generosity  
Host Country Skill Difference 
in migration 
rates in 2000 
(%)1 
Social 
expenditure 
as % GDP2 
Social 
expenditure 
Per capita2 
 
Sweden 
 
 
 
28.80 
 
5124 
Immigration from EUR -30.62  
Immigration from non-EUR DC 4.32   
Immigration from LDC 67.67   
The Netherlands  25.40 3767 
Immigration from EUR -3.89   
Immigration from non-EUR DC 6.38   
Immigration from LDC 49.32   
UK  18.23 1567 
Immigration from EUR 36.81   
Immigration from non-EUR DC 70.03   
Immigration from LDC 91.74   
Spain  17.47 1475 
Immigration from EUR 47.91   
    
Immigration from non-EUR DC 68.86   
Immigration from LDC 63.69   
EUR  20.56 3072 
Immigration from EUR 15.77   
Immigration from non-EUR DC 59.36   
Immigration from LDC 65.60   
Notes: Skill difference in migration rates denotes high skilled migration rate minus unskilled migration rate. Social 
expenditure as % GDP (average for 1980-90); Social expenditure per capita is in PPP 1990 US dollars, average for 
1974-90.  
Sources: 1Authors’ calculations based on Docquier and Marfouk (2006). 2OECD, Social Expenditure Database 
(SOCX). 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 3:  OLS Estimates with Lagged Dependent Variable 
Dependent Variable: Skill Difference in Migration Rates in 2000 
 EUR & DC  
to EUR 
EUR & LDC  
to EUR 
 
Welfare generosity  
      
benefits per capita (logs)  -0.110 -0.112 -0.116 -0.115 -0.136 -0.131
1974-90 (host) (0.057)* (0.056)** (0.047)** (0.056)** (0.053)** (0.047)*** 
benefits per capita (logs)  0.113 0.137 0.132 0.102 0.101 0.110 
1974-90 (host) X R (0.053)** (0.064)** (0.055)** (0.065) (0.079) (0.066)* 
 
Lagged migration rates 
      
low-skilled migration rate  -0.719 -0.719 -0.710 -0.612 -0.611 -0.609 
1990  (0.133)*** (0.129)*** (0.140)*** (0.128)*** (0.129)*** (0.137)*** 
low-skilled migration rate  1.723 1.751 1.723 0.278 0.560 0.552 
1990  x R (0.173)*** (0.169)*** (0.171)*** (0.196) (0.234)** (0.226)** 
high-skilled migration rate  1.062 1.061 1.049 0.963 0.959 0.957 
1990  (0.150)*** (0.147)*** (0.155)*** (0.145)*** (0.146)*** (0.153)*** 
high-skilled migration rate  -0.725 -0.726 -0.712 -0.481 -0.627 -0.623 
1990  x R (0.149)*** (0.144)*** (0.151)*** (0.157)*** (0.170)*** (0.173)***
 
Returns to skills 
      
high-low labor ratio in   -0.484   0.309  
1990 - (host)  (0.237)** (0.326)  
high-low labor ratio in   0.309 0.019  
1990 (host) X F  (0.500)   (0.656)  
high-low wage diff. in    0.003   0.001 
1995 (host)    (0.002)   (0.003) 
high-low wage diff. in   -0.007   -0.005 
1995 - (host) X F   (0.003)**   (0.003)* 
Gini in 1990 (source)  0.012 0.013  0.011 0.011 
  (0.004)*** (0.004)***  (0.004)** (0.005)** 
Gini in 1990 (source) X R  -0.012 -0.014  -0.010 -0.010 
  (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)** (0.005)*
 
high-low unemp. rate diff. 
  
0.002 
 
0.001 
  
0.003 
 
0.006 
in 1990 (host)   (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) 
high-low unemp. rate diff.  -0.002 -0.004  -0.005 -0.008 
in 1990 - (host) X F  (0.004) (0.004)  (0.005) (0.005)* 
 
Immigration policies 
      
Total migrant stock  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
in 1990 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)*** (0.001)** (0.001)** 
Share of refugees in 1990 -2.079 -1.023 -3.904 -0.238 -1.945 -1.297 
 (2.803) (3.237) (3.403) (2.145) (2.477) (3.007) 
Observations 384 384 360 601 570 534 
R-squared 0.864 0.870 0.874 0.832 0.809 0.814 
Notes:   F=Free migration; R=Restricted migration. Regressions include log distance, dummy for same language in 
host and source, strong dummy between host and source, & real GDP per capita in host and in source countries. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
    
Table 4: OLS Estimates Using Migration Rates Adjusted by Relative Educational Quality 
 Dependent Variable: Skill Difference in Migration (REQ) Rates  in 2000  
 EUR & DC  
to EUR 
EUR & LDC  
to EUR 
 
Welfare generosity 
      
benefits per capita  -0.105 -0.115 -0.109 -0.111 -0.116 -0.138 
(logs) 1974-90 (host) (0.052)** (0.049)** (0.042)** (0.051)** (0.054)** (0.054)** 
benefits per capita (logs)  0.115 0.139 0.135 0.104 0.111 0.132 
1974-90 (host) X R (0.053)** (0.062)** (0.054)** (0.059)* (0.070) (0.062)** 
 
Lagged migration rates 
      
low-skilled migration  -0.697 -0.695 -0.686 -0.681 -0.595 -0.578 
rate (REQ) 1990  (0.151)*** (0.149)*** (0.160)*** (0.156)*** (0.143)*** (0.150)*** 
low-skilled migration  1.711 1.738 1.713 0.715 0.576 0.314 
rate (REQ) 1990  x R (0.175)*** (0.172)*** (0.174)*** (0.295)** (0.217)*** (0.208) 
high-skilled migration  1.037 1.033 1.022 1.011 0.937 0.920 
rate (REQ) 1990  (0.169)*** (0.168)*** (0.176)*** (0.175)*** (0.162)*** (0.167)*** 
high-skilled migration  -0.702 -0.702 -0.688 -0.584 -0.637 -0.468 
rate (REQ) 1990  x R (0.167)*** (0.164)*** (0.171)*** (0.194)*** (0.175)*** (0.178)***
 
Returns to skills 
      
high-low labor ratio in   -0.482   0.205  
1990 - (host)  (0.234)** (0.302)  
high-low labor ratio in   0.325 0.043  
1990 (host) X F  (0.482)   (0.571)  
high-low wage diff. in   0.002   0.003 
1995 - (host)   (0.002)   (0.003) 
high-low wage diff. in    -0.007   -0.006 
1995 (host) X R   (0.003)**   (0.003)* 
Gini in 1990 (source)  0.013 0.014  0.011 0.013 
  (0.004)*** (0.004)***  (0.004)*** (0.005)*** 
Gini in 1990 (source)   -0.013 -0.014  -0.011 -0.011 
X R  (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)** (0.005)**
       
high-low unemp. rate    0.001  0.001 0.006 
diff. in 1990 - (host)   (0.002)  (0.002) (0.004) 
high-low unemp. rate    -0.004  -0.005 -0.009 
diff. in 1990 (host) X F   (0.004)  (0.004) (0.005)* 
 
Immigration policies 
      
Total migrant stock  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
in 1990 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)*** (0.001)** 
Share of refugees in  -1.907 -1.168 -3.680 -0.672 -2.954 -1.497 
1990 (2.547) (3.230) (3.298) (1.983) (2.509) (3.081) 
Observations 384 384 360 569 569 533 
R-squared 0.861 0.867 0.871 0.842 0.816 0.835 
Notes: All the migration rates are adjusted for the quality of education by the relative education quality in source to host 
country, i.e. REQ = (EQs/EQh );  F=Free migration; R=Restricted migration. Regressions include log distance, dummy for 
same language in host and source, strong dummy between host and source, and real GDP per capita in host and in 
source countries. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
    
 
Table 5: IV Estimates with Lagged Dependent Variable 
Dependent Variable: Skill Difference in Migration Rates in 2000 
 EUR & DC  
to EUR 
EUR & LDC  
to EUR 
 
Welfare generosity 
      
Fitted benefits per capita   -0.157 -0.217 -0.118 -0.181 -0.180 -0.154 
(logs) 1974-90 (host) (0.081)* (0.097)** (0.063)* (0.080)** (0.089)** (0.070)** 
Fitted benefits per capita   0.270 0.261 0.207 0.198 0.209 0.161 
(logs) 1974-90 (host) X R (0.089)*** (0.099)*** (0.078)*** (0.088)** (0.103)** (0.083)* 
 
Lagged migration rates 
      
low-skilled migration  -0.711 -0.711 -0.706 -0.592 -0.581 -0.581 
rate 1990  (0.130)*** (0.125)*** (0.135)*** (0.131)*** (0.131)*** (0.137)*** 
low-skilled migration  1.774 1.775 1.752 0.563 0.556 0.562 
rate 1990  x R (0.171)*** (0.166)*** (0.169)*** (0.229)** (0.229)** (0.221)** 
high-skilled migration  1.055 1.052 1.046 0.944 0.931 0.933 
rate 1990  (0.147)*** (0.142)*** (0.150)*** (0.148)*** (0.148)*** (0.152)*** 
high-skilled migration  -0.726 -0.722 -0.713 -0.627 -0.611 -0.618 
rate 1990  x R (0.147)*** (0.141)*** (0.148)*** (0.166)*** (0.168)*** (0.168)***
 
Returns to skills 
      
high-low labor ratio in   -1.455   0.060  
1990 - (host)  (0.541)*** (0.458)  
high-low labor ratio in   0.794 0.522  
1990 (host ) X F  (0.548)   (0.690)  
high-low wage diff. in    0.003   0.003 
1995 (host)    (0.002)   (0.003) 
high-low wage diff. in   -0.008   -0.006 
1995 - (host) X F   (0.003)***   (0.003)* 
Gini in 1990 (source)  0.012 0.012  0.011 0.011 
  (0.004)*** (0.004)***  (0.004)*** (0.004)** 
Gini in 1990 (source) X R  -0.013 -0.015  -0.010 -0.010 
  (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)** (0.005)**
       
high-low unemp. rate   0.011 -0.000  0.005 0.005 
diff. 1990 (host)   (0.005) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.004) 
high-low unemp. rate    -0.005 -0.005  -0.008 -0.008 
diff. 1990 - (host) X F  (0.005) (0.004)  (0.006) (0.005)* 
 
Immigration policies 
      
Total migrant stock  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
in 1990 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)** 
Share of refugees in 1990 -2.470 0.827 -4.835 -1.590 -2.990 -2.261 
 (3.174) (3.803) (3.670) (2.603) (2.827) (3.266) 
 
Cragg-Donald F- statistics 
 
49.46 
 
54.34 
 
103.01 
 
86.23 
 
98.44 
 
159.12 
Observations 384 384 360 538 538 504 
R-squared 0.865 0.871 0.875 0.811 0.815 0.821 
Notes:  F=Free migration; R=Restricted migration. Instrumented using legal origin dummies, and the interaction of legal origin 
dummies and R. Regressions include real GDP per capita growth rate in host, log distance, dummy for same 
language in host and source, strong dummy between host and source, and real GDP per capita in host and in source 
countries.   
 Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
 
Table 6: IV Estimates with Lagged Dependent Variable and Adjusted by Relative Educational 
Quality (REQ) 
Dependent Variable: Skill Difference in Migration Rates (REQ) in 2000 
 EUR & DC  
to EUR 
EUR & LDC  
to EUR 
Welfare generosity       
Fitted benefits per capita   -0.159 -0.207 -0.170 -0.175 -0.179 -0.178 
(logs) 1974-90 (host) (0.075)** (0.087)** (0.070)** (0.076)** (0.079)** (0.064)*** 
Fitted benefits per capita   0.269 0.268 0.207 0.207 0.218 0.194 
(logs) 1974-90 (host) X R (0.089)*** (0.098)*** (0.077)*** (0.083)** (0.102)** (0.080)**
 
Lagged migration rates 
      
low-skilled migration  -0.686 -0.685 -0.678 -0.602 -0.665 -0.666 
rate (REQ) 1990  (0.148)*** (0.145)*** (0.155)*** (0.144)*** (0.154)*** (0.164)*** 
low-skilled migration  1.753 1.765 1.732 0.553 0.694 0.686 
rate (REQ) 1990  x R (0.172)*** (0.170)*** (0.174)*** (0.212)*** (0.290)** (0.292)** 
high-skilled migration  1.026 1.022 1.014 0.941 0.991 0.989 
rate (REQ) 1990  (0.166)*** (0.163)*** (0.171)*** (0.163)*** (0.173)*** (0.180)*** 
high-skilled migration  -0.698 -0.693 -0.684 -0.632 -0.566 -0.564 
rate (REQ) 1990  x R (0.164)*** (0.162)*** (0.168)*** (0.173)*** (0.193)*** (0.198)*** 
 
Returns to skills 
      
high-low labor ratio in   -1.192   0.075  
1990 - (host)  (0.358)***   (0.386)  
high-low labor ratio in   0.833   0.027  
1990 (host) X F  (0.534)   (0.574)  
high-low wage diff. in    0.004   0.003 
1995 (host)    (0.002)*   (0.002) 
high-low wage diff. in   -0.007   -0.007 
1995 - (host) X F   (0.003)**   (0.005)** 
Gini in 1990 (source)  0.012 0.013  0.012 0.013 
  (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)***
Gini in 1990 (source) X R  -0.013 -0.015  -0.012 -0.012 
  (0.005)*** (0.005)***  (0.004)*** (0.004)*** 
       
high-low unemp. rate diff.   0.008 0.002  0.003 0.006 
in 1990 (host)   (0.003)** (0.003)  (0.003) (0.004) 
high-low unemp. rate diff.   -0.005 -0.005  -0.008 -0.012 
in 1990 - (host) X F  (0.005) (0.004)  (0.005) (0.004)*** 
 
Immigration policies 
      
Total migrant stock in 1990 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)** (0.001) (0.001) 
Share of refugees in 1990 -2.592 0.106 -2.809 -1.768 -1.694 -1.315 
 (3.245) (3.535) (3.548) (2.476) (2.571) (2.919) 
 
Cragg-Donald F- statistics 
 
51.69 
 
58.98 
 
62.65 
 
86.45 
 
92.77 
 
169.49 
Observations 384 384 360 538 569 533 
R-squared 0.863 0.867 0.871 0.805 0.830 0.835 
Notes: All the migration rates are adjusted for the quality of education by relative quality in source to host, i.e. 
REQ = (EQs/EQh) , F=Free migration; R=Restricted migration. Instrumented using legal origin dummies, and the 
interaction of legal origin dummies and R. Regressions include real GDP per capita growth rate in host, log 
distance, dummy for same language in host and source, strong dummy between host and source, and real GDP per 
capita in host and in source countries.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
Table 7:  IV Estimates for Flows: Specification (1b) 
 EUR & DC  
to EUR 
EUR & LDC  
to EUR 
Dependent variable: Skill Difference Migration Rates: Flows (1990-2000)1
Welfare generosity   
Fitted benefits per capita   -0.571 -0.292 
(logs) 1974-90 (host) (0.242)** (0.118)** 
Fitted benefits per capita   0.585 0.294 
(logs) 1974-90 (host) X R (0.280)** (0.156)* 
 
Dependent variable: Skill Difference Migration Rates adjusted by Relative Educational Quality: Flows 
(1990-2000)2 
Welfare generosity   
Fitted benefits per capita   -0.576 -0.372 
(logs) 1974-90 (host) (0.248)** (0.181)** 
Fitted benefits per capita   0.598 0.393 
(logs) 1974-90 (host) X R (0.303)** (0.204)* 
Notes: Instrumented using legal origin dummies and the interaction of legal origin dummies and R.  1Both models have all 
controls as in Table 5, column 3 (6) for DCs (LDCs). 2Both models have all controls as in Table 6, column 3 (6) 
for DCs (LDCs). Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
  
 
Table 8:  IV Estimates: Robustness Analysis 
 EUR & DC  
to EUR 
EUR & LDC  
to EUR 
 
Alternatives Adjustment for Education Quality 
1. Dependent variable: Skill Difference Migration Rates, interacted by Source Country Educational Quality1  
Welfare generosity   
Fitted benefits per capita   -0.860 -0.905 
(logs) 1974-90 (host) (0.358)** (0.324)*** 
Fitted benefits per capita   0.904 0.970 
(logs) 1974-90 (host) X R (0.400)** (0.402)** 
 
2. Dependent variable: Skill Difference Migration Rates, weighted Source Country by Education Quality2 
Welfare generosity  
Fitted benefits per capita   -0.035 -0.037 
(logs) 1974-90 (host) (0.016)** (0.014)*** 
Fitted benefits per capita   0.038 0.039 
(logs) 1974-90 (host) X R (0.0174)** (0.021)* 
 
Alternative measure for Benefits 
3. Dependent variable: Skill Difference Migration Rates3 
Welfare generosity   
Fitted benefits % GDP   -0.018 -0.017 
(logs) 1980-90 (host) (0.010)* (0.009)** 
Fitted benefits % GDP  (logs) 1980-
90 (host) X R 
0.022 
(0.009)** 
0.018 
(0.011)* 
4. Dependent variable: Skill Difference Migration Rates, adjusted by Relative Education Quality4 
Welfare generosity   
Fitted benefits % GDP   -0.018 -0.019 
(logs) 1980-90 (host) (0.010)* (0.008)** 
Fitted benefits % GDP  (logs) 1980-
90 (host) X R 
0.022 
(0.009)** 
0.024 
(0.010)** 
Notes: Instrumented using legal origin dummies and the interaction of legal origin dummies and R. 1Both models have all 
controls as in Table 6, column 3 (6) for DCs (LDCs), but migration rates are interacted by  source country Educational Quality. 
2Both models have all controls as in Table 6, column 3 (6) for DCs (LDCs), but migration rates are weighted by source country 
Educational Quality. 3Both models have all controls as in Table 5, column 3 (6) for DCs (LDCs). 4Both models have all 
controls as in Table 6, column 3 (6) for DCs (LDCs). 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
      Appendix: 
Table A1: Test Scores 
EUR DC LDC 
Country EQ Country EQ Country EQ 
Austria 5.089 Australia 5.094 Argentina 3.920 
Belgium 5.041 Canada 5.038 Brazil 3.638 
Switzerland 5.142 Hong Kong 5.195 Chile 4.049 
Denmark 4.962 Israel 4.686 China 4.939 
Spain 4.829 Japan 5.310 Colombia 4.152 
Finland 5.126 Korea, Rep. 5.338 Egypt 4.030 
France 5.040 New Zealand 4.978 Indonesia 3.880 
United 
Kingdom 4.950 Singapore 5.330 India 4.281
Germany 4.956 
Taiwan 
(Chinese Taipei) 5.452 Iran 4.219 
Greece 4.608 United States 4.903 Jordan 4.264 
Ireland 4.995   Lebanon 3.950 
Italy 4.758   Morocco 3.327 
Netherlands 5.115   Mexico 3.998 
Norway 4.830   Malaysia 4.838 
Portugal 4.564   Nigeria 4.154 
Sweden 5.013   Peru 3.125 
    Philippines 3.647 
    Thailand 4.565 
   Tunisia 3.795
    Turkey 4.128 
    South Africa 3.089 
Group 
Averages 4.939  5.132  3.999 
Notes: EQ = average test score in maths and science, primary through end of secondary school, all years (scaled to PISA scale divided by 100). 
 
 
 
Table A2: Example of Education Adjustment 
Emigration rate of High skilled Egypt-UK migration Egypt-Italy migration 
Unadjusted 0.2435 0.1144 
Adjusted: REQ 0.198 0.0969 
Adjusted: WEQ 0.0604 0.0284 
REQ =DM. (EQs/EQh ); WEQ =DM(1/.EQs))  
